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Abt Associates, Inc., Cambridge, MA, USAA B S T R A C TBackground: Low-income, publicly insured admissions historically
cost more to treat than does the average patient. To ensure that
hospitals are reimbursed an adequate amount for care of indigent
populations, Medicare reimburses hospitals an additional percentage
amount according to federally set ﬁnancial schedule. At 15% of a
disproportionate patient percentage, a hospital is reimbursed an extra
2.5% of the standard prospective payment rate. Objective: This
research seeks to determine whether hospital qualiﬁcation as a
Medicare Disproportionate Share Hospital results in higher patient
experience ratings. Methods: A regression discontinuity method was
used to determine the effect of lagged Disproportionate Share Hospi-
tal (DSH) status on next year patient experience ratings. The Hospital
Consumer Assessment of Healthcare Providers and Systems data
provide publicly available patient ratings. Results: On average, hos-
pital ratings increase by 6% as a result of DSH status. Hospital ratings
increase by an average of 6.5% when nonproﬁt hospitals are analyzed.see front matter Copyright & 2014, International S
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ndence to: Allison Marier, Abt Associates, Inc., 55This ﬁnding is primarily driven by patient facility cleanliness and
medical provider communication ratings. Conclusions: The federal
mandate that individuals purchase health insurance in the United
States coupled with the state expansion of Medicaid coverage will
theoretically eliminate the need for Medicare DSH payments. It is
calculated, however, that hospitals will need increased Medicaid
reimbursements of more than $300 per patient to make up for the
loss of Medicare DSH reimbursements. Hospitals will likely suffer
ﬁnancially as a direct result of reduced Medicare reimbursements
through the DSH program.
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For the same illness, low-income patients are more costly to treat
than those who are not indigent. To compensate hospitals for the
difference in the cost of care between patients, Medicare reim-
burses hospitals with more than 15% low-income patient admis-
sions an additional percentage of the prospective payment rate
[1,2]. This research analyzes patient-reported hospital experience
ratings to determine whether funds that should be allocated
toward patient care are being used for this purpose.
Determination as a low-income patient requires enrollment in
either Medicare combined with the receipt of federal ﬁnancial
assistance or a state’s Medicaid health insurance program. These
programs require asset or income tests to qualify for public
assistance eligibility, and are used by hospitals, states, and the
federal government to distinguish low-income patients from the
rest of the population [3,4].
Twenty-six percent of a hospital’s admissions, on average, are
low-income. This percentage is called a hospital’s “dispropor-
tionate share,” and a hospital’s Medicare reimbursement rate
directly depends on this percentage.Hospitals that qualify for the Disproportionate Share Hospital
(DSH) reimbursement can expect to receive an additional $2 to $3
million yearly from Medicare. Federal Medicare DSH spending
reached $9.1 billion in 2009 [5]: more than 75% of acute-care
hospitals in the United States qualiﬁed for these funds. Of debate
in the literature is whether the money is used for patient care: most
disproportionate share research examines the effect of additional
reimbursement on hospital mortality rates. By using patient sat-
isfaction scores instead of mortality rates, this research determines
whether patients treated at hospitals that qualify for Medicare’s
DSH program receive different care than do those who do not.
This study differs from previous work in two important ways.
The ﬁrst is that only the Medicare DSH program is evaluated
instead of jointly with a state’s Medicaid DSH program. The
second is that hospital patient experience data are used instead
of hospital mortality ratings or stafﬁng ratios to determine the
extent of hospital care. Hospital quality and effective use of funds
are typically measured by using patient clinical outcome data.
Until recently, this measure has been the best available data for
hospital quality research despite the fact that patients who are
severely ill may choose different hospitals than do the less ill [6].ociety for Pharmacoeconomics and Outcomes Research (ISPOR).
Wheeler Street, Cambridge, MA 02139.
V A L U E I N H E A L T H 1 7 ( 2 0 1 4 ) 2 3 1 – 2 3 7232By using patient mortality and hospital ﬁnancial data from
California, Duggan [7] found that nonpublic hospitals that quali-
ﬁed for Medicaid’s DSH program saw no drop in infant mortality
rates, but instead increased their ﬁnancial holdings dollar for
dollar. Baicker and Staiger [8] found that public hospitals that
receive Medicaid’s DSH program funds see a slight decrease in
infant and heart attack mortality rates. Lindrooth et al. [9]
examined stafﬁng decisions in a study of the effects of the
Balanced Budget Act on safety-net hospitals. When hospital
revenues were adversely affected by a change in reimbursement
rates, non–safety-net (non-DSH) hospitals reduced nursed staff-
ing by approximately 6% and no signiﬁcant effect was found for
DSH hospitals.
Health services research articles often use data from the
recent U.S. Center for Medicaid & Medicare Services (CMS) Physi-
cian, Nursing Home, and Hospital Compare programs. Lehrman
et al. [10] described the correlations between hospital character-
istics and hospital performance on clinical process scores and
patient experience measures. They found that small (fewer than
100 beds) and large (more than 200 beds) hospitals, nonproﬁt
hospitals, and northeastern and midwestern hospitals perform in
the top quartile of both patient experience and clinical process
measures. Werner et al. [11] used the ﬁrst 3 years of the Hospital
Compare clinical process data to determine how DSH payments
affect hospital performance on clinical process quality measures.
The authors separated hospitals with high and low Medicaid
patient percentages (40% and 5%, respectively) and simulated the
effect of a change in reimbursement on the hospital process
quality measures. They found that from 2004 to 2006, safety-net
hospitals showed a smaller performance increase than did non–
safety-net hospitals. Werner et al. [12] found a small, causal, and
positive relationship between nursing home “report cards” and
the market share of nursing homes. Dafny and Dranove [13] used
Medicare enrollee health management organization plan assess-
ments to determine the effect of health management organiza-
tion patient experience scores and Healthcare Effectiveness Data
and Information Set on future changes of plan enrollees.
This analysis used hospital ratings from the Consumer Assess-
ment of Healthcare Providers and Systems. These patient-
provided data rate aspects of the hospital experience. The analysis
was carried out by using patient ratings from the full sample as
well as from a subsample of nonproﬁt hospitals just above and
below the 15% disproportionate patient percentage (DPP) cutoff to
determine the effect of DSH status on hospital ratings. Hospital
ﬁxed effects were included to control for unobserved time-
invariant hospital heterogeneity. The effect of DSH hospital status
was identiﬁed by hospitals switching over the 15% boundary.Table 1 – Reimbursement rules for disproportionate shar
Hospital type Beds DPP Threshold
Urban 0–99 Z.15, r.202
4.202
Urban Z100 Z.15, r.202
4.202
Rural referral center All Z.15, r.202
4.202
Medicare-dependent hospital All Z.15, r.202
4.202
Other rural 0–499 Z.15, r.202
4.202
Z500 Z.15, r.202
4.202
DPP, disproportionate patient percentage.This study found that DSH reimbursement increases hospital
ratings by 8% (6 percentage points) for all owners, and modestly
increases to 10% (6.5 percentage points) for nonproﬁt hospitals. DSH
status increases ratings for nonproﬁt hospitals in all individual
categories, and the effects are statistically signiﬁcant (approxi-
mately a 10% point increase) in the hospital cleanliness and
medical staff communication categories. This ﬁnding is in line with
a recent opinion article published by Pardes and Miller [14] who
argue against a proposed cut in Medicare graduate medical educa-
tion expenditures. The article states that a cut in graduate medical
education funding would affect all the services offered by hospitals;
it is reasonable to expect that Medicare funding cuts through the
DSH reimbursement would similarly affect all hospital services.Disproportionate Share Hospitals
The disproportionate share reimbursement was established in 1985
through the Consolidated Omnibus Reconciliation Act. This act
actualized a switch from cost-based reimbursement to a prospective
payment scheme. To compensate hospitals for treating low-income
patients, Congress created an upward adjustment to traditional
Medicare reimbursement for hospitals that treat a higher share of
the needy. Without additional ﬁnancial incentive, the shift from a
cost-based reimbursement scheme (pre-1986) would not necessarily
ensure that those whomost need intensive care would receive it [15].
The current federal minimum qualiﬁcations for DSH status
are detailed in Table 1. Qualiﬁcation as a DSH hospital is depend-
ent on the number of low-income patients admitted into a
hospital: additional reimbursement is a function of this number.
The current minimum DPP necessary for qualiﬁcation as a DSH
hospital is 15%. The calculation of the disproportionate share
percentage is as follows:
DPP¼Medicare supplemental security income Days
Total Medicare Days
þMedicaid, Non-Medicare Days
Total Patient Days
ð1Þ
Equation 1 adds the hospital’s percentage of dually eligible Medi-
care and supplemental security income patient-days to the hospi-
tal’s percentage of Medicaid (and non-Medicare) patient-days [15].
Mathematically, the DSH adjustment for hospitals with a
speciﬁc DPP can be expressed as follows:
DSH Adjustment¼
0 if DPPo0:15
0:025þ :65 n DPP:15ð Þ½  if 0:15rDPPr0:202
0:0588þ :825 n DPP:202ð Þ½  if 0:202oDPP
2
64
ð2Þe hospitals.
Adjustment Note
.025 þ [.65  (DPP  .15)] Cannot exceed .12
.0588 þ [.825  (DPP  .202)] Cannot exceed .12
.025 þ [.65  (DPP  .15)] No cap
.0588 þ [.825  (DPP  .202)] No cap
.025 þ [.65  (DPP  .15)] No cap
.0588 þ [.825  (DPP  .202)] No cap
.025 þ [.65  (DPP  .15)] No cap
.0588 þ [.825  (DPP  .202)] No cap
.025 þ [.65  (DPP  .15)] Cannot exceed .12
.0588 þ [.825  (DPP  .202)] Cannot exceed .12
.025þ [.65  (DPP  .15)] No cap
.0588þ [.825  (DPP  .202)] No cap
Table 2 – Control variables, above and below the 15% DPP cutoff.
All owners Nonproﬁt
DSH o .15 DSH Z .15 DSH o .15 DSH Z .15
DPP 0.13  0.01 0.17  0.01 0.13  0.01 0.17  0.01
Operating cost to Medicare reimbursement 0.38  0.15 0.36  0.15 0.40  0.15 0.38  0.14
Capital cost to Medicare reimbursement 0.03  0.01 0.03  0.02 0.03  0.01 0.03  0.01
Percent patients Medicare 0.33  0.47 0.33  0.47 0.33  0.47 0.33  0.47
Number of transfer-adjusted cases 4371  3210 4600  3352 4681  3351 4810  3467
Average daily census 130  0108 138  0113 140  0116 146  0118
Teaching 0.37  0.48 0.40  0.49 0.45  0.50 0.45  0.50
Number of providers 408 522 315 390
Note. The number of providers on either side of the DSH cutoff is not stationary through time.
DPP, disproportionate patient percentage; DSH, Disproportionate Share Hospital.
Table 3 – Consumer assessment questions and
hospital rating answers.
Question Patient
response
Mean  SD
How often was the
area around
patients’ rooms
kept quiet at
night?
Always quiet at
night.
0.528  0.1022
How often did the
nurses
communicate well
with patients?
Nurses always
communicated
well.
0.716  0.0693
How often was the
patients’ pain well
controlled?
Pain was always
well
controlled.
0.665  0.0609
How often were the
patients’ rooms
and bathrooms
kept clean?
Room was
always clean.
0.660  0.0757
How often did
patients receive
help quickly from
hospital staff?
Patients always
received help
as soon as
they wanted.
0.583  0.0851
How often did staff
explain about
medicines before
giving them to
patients?
Staff always
explained.
0.565  0.0676
How do the patients
rate the hospital
overall?
Patients gave a
rating of 9 or
10 (high).
0.627  0.0959
Would the patients
recommend the
hospital to friends
and family?
Yes, patients
would
deﬁnitely
recommend
the hospital.
0.675  0.1045
Were patients given
information about
what to do during
their recovery at
home?
Yes, staff did give
patients this
information.
0.791  0.0543
How often did
doctors
communicate well
with patients?
Doctors always
communicated
well
0.778  0.0549
V A L U E I N H E A L T H 1 7 ( 2 0 1 4 ) 2 3 1 – 2 3 7 233The discontinuity in a hospital’s DSH status adjustment pro-
vides an exceptional opportunity to study hospital quality as a
function of a change in service price: while hospitals qualify for
DSH status when 15% of the admissions are low-income and pub-
licly insured, there should be no signiﬁcant difference between
observables other than quality in hospitals just above and below
the cutoff (Table 2). A reimbursement kink exists when a hospital
reaches the 20.2% DPP; this kink is not analyzed because it does
not provide enough variation for me to identify an effect of reim-
bursement on patient satisfaction.
Data
The CMS makes publicly available on its Web site the impact ﬁles
for each ﬁscal year [16]. The impact ﬁles contain hospital-
aggregated data for each individual hospital’s ﬁscal year, including
the information needed for Medicare reimbursement adjustment as
well as demographic information that may be used to explain
variation. Hospital impact ﬁles from the ﬁscal year before each
patient survey update are used. If a hospital is considered a DSH
hospital at the end of the ﬁscal year 2006, the impact of this
designation is estimated by using patients in the ﬁscal year 2007.
The impact ﬁles include the following hospital characteristics for
each year: DPP, hospital’s teaching status, Medicare patient-days to
total days, operating and capital costs to Medicare reimbursement
ratios, average daily census, and total number of cases.
The outcome of interest in this study uses the Hospital
Consumer Assessment of Healthcare Providers and Systems data.
These data provide detailed information submitted by patients
about their hospital stay. During the year, a random sample of
patients is contacted after their hospital visits to answer surveys
about their stays. The patients are asked 10 questions regarding
their hospital stay; each hospital collects the data and reports it
to the CMS. The aggregated data are made publicly available by
the hospital, which allows for the construction of an average
overall rating for the hospital and hospital analysis by a speciﬁc
measure. The questions asked are listed in Table 3: ultimately
used for analysis is the percentage of patients who responded
that the hospital scored “high” or “very good” in a category. For
brevity, these percentages are called “hospital ratings.”
Estimation
A regression discontinuity framework is used to identify the
effect of a hospital’s DSH status on average patient hospital
experience scores. The receipt of DSH funds can be treated as
exogenous for hospitals within a certain percentage of the DSH
qualiﬁcation cutoff; these hospitals are “close” in their DPPs and
are unable to exactly manipulate this variable [17–19].
V A L U E I N H E A L T H 1 7 ( 2 0 1 4 ) 2 3 1 – 2 3 7234In short, this study hinges on the assumption that close to the
cutoff, hospital receipt of DSH funds is random. A regression
discontinuity design in this context assumes that hospitals that
fall short of the DSH status cutoff are the counterfactual of
hospitals directly to the right of the cutoff. The assumption that
differences between hospitals above and below the cutoff are
either observable or that unobservable characteristics are time-
invariant allows for the identiﬁcation of the effect of DSH funds.
Nonproﬁt acute care hospitals comprise the vast majority of
hospital types: approximately two-thirds of the hospitals
reported by the CMS in 2009 were nonproﬁt organizations. For-
proﬁt, acute care hospitals were a distant second in sheer
numbers: 20% of the 2452 hospitals in the data are for-proﬁt.
The remaining 328 hospitals (approximately 13% of the data) are
publicly owned at the federal, state, or local levels. After con-
straining the sample to hospitals that have a disproportionate
share percentage around the 15% cutoff, approximately 500
hospitals remain (Table 2).
Nonparametrically, the ideal distance away from the cutoff of
15% is determined by selecting from a range of bandwidths and
ﬁtting an estimated curve to the outcome both above and below
the cutoff. The distance that provided the lowest mean squared
errors in a regression of average hospital satisfaction scores on a
constant regressor was chosen as the best bandwidth. The
chosen bandwidth was a distance of 1.5% from either side of
the cutoff.
Also included in Table 2 are hospital mean covariates;
hospitals in the sample on either side of the cutoff have similar
characteristics. These similarities address hospital sample
selection concerns, that is, whether the receipt of DSH funds
can be considered random when a hospital is close to the DSH
cutoff. An analysis of hospitals with observably different char-
acteristics on either side of the cutoff would render a direct
interpretation untenable. Table 2 directly shows, however, that
these characteristics are similar. An additional way to deter-
mine whether a hospital can choose to receive DSH payments is
to examine frequencies of hospitals on either side of the DSH
cutoff. Shown in Figure 1 is a density test that examines hospital
selection around the DSH cutoff. Table 2 reports hospital
frequencies on either side of the 15% cutoff, while Figure 1
includes a visual veriﬁcation that hospitals do not choose to
receive Medicare reimbursement [18].
To address concerns about unobserved hospital character-
istics such as initial reputation, span of medical services, and
presence and size of teaching programs, hospital-speciﬁc ﬁxed
effects are included. Concerns about hospital adaptation to
scores and cross-subsidization across hospital services may existFig. 1if a several-year panel of data were analyzed [20]. For this reason,
the data are speciﬁcally limited to a span of ﬁve quarters: the
assumption is made that if a hospital’s resource allocation
changes in response to the Hospital Consumer Assessment of
Healthcare Providers and Systems, the hospital’s responses are
gradual and lagged after public reports of the scores are released.
To control for wide variation on both sides of the cutoff, however,
provider time trends are included. Time dummies are included as
additional controls.
Hospital ratings are used as a dependent variable to deter-
mine whether hospitals that receive DSH reimbursement are
using the extra resources in a signiﬁcantly different way from
hospitals that are just below the cutoff. The parsimonious
estimating equation is as follows:
Approval Ratingit¼α0þβ1 DSH statusit1ð Þ
þβ2 DSH statusit1 n % DSH Patientsit1ð Þ
þβ3 % DSH Patientsit1ð ÞþλtþαiþProvider Trenditþ2it
Here, the effect of hospital i’s DSH status in the previous year,
DSHit1 is estimated on the hospital’s approval rating in the next
year, Approval Ratingit. To allow for hospital ratings to have
different slopes on either side of the DSH cutoff, DPP (% DSH
Patients) in time t  1 is included, along with the interaction
between DSH status and the DPP. This interaction captures any
potential difference in patient satisfaction trends between hos-
pitals above and below the cutoff. The regressions include
whether a hospital qualiﬁed for DSH adjustments in the previous
year to avoid upward simultaneity bias issues with stafﬁng and
quality.
All ratings are pooled to determine whether hospitals just
above or below the DSH cutoff have higher ratings on average than
do those below the cutoff. The ratings can also be separated by
individual question. The same analysis is repeated for overall
ratings and for category ratings. Additional analysis includes the
covariates previously discussed:
Approval Ratingit¼α0þβ1 DSH statusit1ð Þ
þβ2 DSH statusit1n % DSH Patientsit1ð Þ
þβ3 % DSH Patientsit1ð ÞþX
0
itβþλtþαiþProvider Trenditþ2itResults
DSH status increases a hospital’s overall average rating in the full
sample by 6 percentage points (Table 4). Columns 3 and 4 report
the effect of DSH status on the nonproﬁt hospital sample: the
effect jumps to a little under 7 percentage points, which trans-
lates to roughly a 10% increase in average hospital rating. After
the inclusion of covariates, this effect remains statistically
signiﬁcant and stable. For the nonproﬁt hospital subsample, the
coefﬁcient on the interaction term is strongly negative and
signiﬁcant both before and after the addition of covariates. The
cost of an increase in low-income patients may not be fully
compensated by DSH payments, and stretches further a hospi-
tal’s resources as a result. The positive coefﬁcient on the DPP
variable captures a hospital’s increasing ability to provide care as
the number of challenging cases increases.
DSH status has a positive effect on all categories when non-
proﬁt hospitals are analyzed (Table 5). The largest and statisti-
cally signiﬁcant difference that DSH status has on nonproﬁt
hospitals is in the categories of hospital cleanliness, doctor
communication, and nurse communication, at just under 14, 9,
and 8 percentage points, respectively.
As a robustness check, a placebo DSH cutoff at a DPP of 12%
was analyzed for both samples. The placebo DSH cutoff esti-
mated that the effect of the DSH varied between 1% and 1% and
Table 4 – Overall satisfaction regression.
Variables All owners Nonproﬁt
(1) Average quality (2) Average quality (3) Average quality (4) Average quality
Medicare DSH 0.0569* (0.0341) 0.0592* (0.0347) 0.0616 (0.0383) 0.0664* (0.0390)
DSH  DPP 0.420* (0.225) 0.415* (0.234) 0.478* (0.251) 0.454* (0.258)
DPP 0.398† (0.155) 0.345† (0.165) 0.480‡ (0.174) 0.415†
Medicare percentage  DSH 0.00748 (0.0194) 0.00118 (0.0193) 0.0134 (0.0211) 0.00448 (0.0226)
Medicare percentage 0.00992 (0.0401) 0.0141 (0.0401) 0.00277 (0.0445) 0.0100 (0.0451)
Constant 0.595‡ (0.0307) 0.632‡ (0.0390) 0.590‡ (0.0340) 0.618‡ (0.0467)
Observations 1533 1521 1171 1159
R2 0.744 0.751 0.755 0.763
Number of providers 518 513 393 388
Covariates No Yes No Yes
State effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Provider trends Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Outcome variable is average top-box patient satisfaction score pooled across hospitals.
Individual category metrics: whether patient considers hospital to be excellent, pain management, cleanliness, physician communication,
nurse communication, staff communication, recommend to friends, noise levels, received help when needed, and received discharge
information. Demographics include Medicare patient percentage, hospital teaching status, operating and capital costs to Medicare
reimbursement ratios, average daily census, and total number of cases.
* P o 0.1.
† P o 0.05.
‡ P o 0.01.
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the right of the Medicare DSH cutoff is untenable because
hospitals in the placebo receive varying amounts of state aid
depending on the running variable; individual state Medicaid
programs often provide supplementary ﬁnancial assistance to
hospitals when a hospital’s DPP falls between 17% and 21%.
The analysis is also robust to the choice of distance from the
DSH cutoff. The results remain similar and vary in signiﬁcance
only when larger or smaller bandwidths are chosen, up to a
distance of 2 percentage points of DPP from the cutoff. The
robustness limits are sensible because state Medicaid program
aid can confound the estimates of Medicare DSH payments on
patient satisfaction for high levels of DPPs.
Policy Implications and Discussion
The disproportionate share adjustment was designed to reim-
burse hospitals for a higher cost of care for large numbers of
the indigent population. It appears, however, that a large
number of hospitals that receive these funds have higher
hospital ratings than do those that do not. This article found
that hospitals that are eligible for DSH funds tend to have
cleaner patient facilities and better doctor and nurse commu-
nication than do those that do not receive the funds: evidence
presented here suggests that this effect is primarily driven by
the increase in quality in care provided by lower performing
hospitals after receiving Medicare DSH funds. It is unclear
whether hospitals that fall short of the DSH cutoff do not have
the resources to maintain proper medical or maintenance staff
or whether those hospitals that receive DSH funds are expand-
ing current programs because they are no longer constrained
by the cost of current care. Lindrooth et al. [9] suggest the
former. One could consider, however, the improvement in
hospital service as a response to the attainment of DSH status
to be a legitimate hospital response to meet the needs of a
higher resource-intensive patient population.
The passage of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act
will lead to many more individuals insured through either Medicaidor private insurance. As a direct result of the increase in the number
of insured, the federal government plans to reduce and, ultimately,
eliminate the Medicare disproportionate share adjustment. The
implications for the elimination of the program are unclear: the
previous analysis shows that DSH funds are used, at least in part, by
hospitals to increase staff quality. This increase in staff quality
could be considered necessary (i.e., hospitals were operating at low
staff levels because of an inability to pay salaries) or be viewed as
excessive, in that DSH payments cover the cost of indigent care and
additionally subsidize an expansion of hospital operation.
The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 man-
dates that, starting in 2014, individuals purchase health insurance.
For hospitals with DSH status to ﬁnancially “break even,” state
Medicaid reimbursements must rise when Medicare DSH reim-
bursements are eliminated. One can conservatively estimate that
hospitals receive $750,000 through the Medicare DSH reimburse-
ment adjustment. If the hospital sees an increase of 5% (approx-
imately 500) of previously uninsured Medicaid patients, then state
Medicaid reimbursement would have to increase by $375 per
Medicaid patient to break even in the new system.
A weakness of this study is a dearth of information about
the mechanisms through which DSH funds affect patient
experience ratings. Additional data could verify whether hos-
pitals increased their stafﬁng and subsequently improved their
communication score performance, or whether more funds
were spent on hiring cleaning staff to improve hospitals’
cleanliness scores. One could also determine whether DSH
reimbursements were spent in areas that did not show improv-
ement. Cost-center–level analysis would concretely answer
questions about the mechanisms through which DSH funds
manifest themselves in the patient experience. An ideal study
would include the amount of money that hospitals were
reimbursed, thus allowing for intent-to-treat and an effect of
the treatment on the treated analysis. The purpose of including
dollar amounts in any analysis would be to identify the effect
of a DSH program dollar on hospital quality. The current
analysis, however, addresses the issue of DSH reimbursements
despite data limitations.
Table 5 – Categorical results for nonproﬁt subsample (with covariates).
Variables (1) Patient
considers
excellent hospital
(2) Pain was
always well
managed
(3) Rooms/
bathrooms well
always clean
(4) Doctors always
communicated
well
(5) Nurses always
communicated
well
Medicare
DSH
0.0836 (0.0642) 0.0623 (0.0672) 0.133* (0.0669) 0.0927*(0.0410) 0.0761† (0.0460)
DSH  DPP 0.541 (0.423) 0.419 (0.451) 0.990* (0.433) 0.682* (0.274) 0.478 (0.305)
DPP 0.402 (0.351) 0.469 (0.352) 1.030‡ (0.312) 0.622‡ (0209) 0.526* (0.242)
Constant 0.718‡ (0.0902) 0.561‡ (0.0732) 0.453‡ (0.0790) 0.646‡ (0.0563) 0.662‡ (0.0600)
Observations 1159 1159 1159 1159 1159
R2 0.764 0.678 0.749 0.728 0.701
Number of
providers
388 388 388 388 388
Covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Provider
effects
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Provider
trends
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Variables (6) Staff always
provided
information
(7) Would deﬁnitely
recommend to
friends
(8) Area outside room
was always quiet
(9) Always received
help when needed
(10) Discharge
information was
given
Medicare
DSH
0.0107 (0.0590) 0.152 (0.0958) 0.0110 (0.0725) 0.0798 (0.0692) 0.0397 (0.0456)
DSH  DPP 0.0981 (0.383) 0.911 (0.594) 0.138 (0.489) 0.649 (0.469) 0.270 (0.299)
DPP 0.167 (0.301) 0.535† (0.277) 0.240 (0.356) 0.458 (0.375) 0.00508 (0.204)
Constant 0.517‡ 0.736‡ (0.0968) 0.615‡ (0.0815) 0.547‡ (0.0883) 0.858‡ (0.0522)
Observations 1159 1159 1159 1159 1159
R2 0.724 0.624 0.768 0.739 0.753
Number of
providers
388 388 388 388 388
Covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Provider
effects
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Provider
trends
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Outcome is patient experience top-box score publicly available from Hospital Compare.
Demographics include Medicare patient percentage, hospital teaching status, operating and capital costs to Medicare reimbursement ratios,
average daily census, and total number of cases.
* P o 0 .05.
† P o 0.1.
‡ P o 0.01.
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The historical test of hospital quality has been to examine
hospital mortality rates for various conditions. The recent avail-
ability of consumer satisfaction surveys, however, has allowed
for a different and more precise estimation of hospital quality.
This research found that DSH status increases a hospital’s ratings
by 6 percentage points across all owners, jumping to more than 6
percentage points when nonproﬁt institutions are isolated.Acknowledgments
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